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Abstract 
This paper examines whether managerial overconfidence enhances or weakens pecking order 
preference. We construct time-varying managerial words-EDVHG LH WRQH RI &KDLUPDQ¶V
Statement) and action-based (i.e. firm investment DQG GLUHFWRUV¶ WUDGLQJ) overconfidence 
measures. Both optimistic tone and industry-adjusted investment have significant and 
negative impacts on the pecking order coefficient in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
regression framework. Overconfident managers tend to use more equity than debt to finance 
deficits. This new evidence is consistent with the proposition that overconfident managers 
who underestimate the riskiness of future earnings believe that their debt (equity) is 
undervalued (overvalued) and therefore prefer equity to debt financing. Thus, managerial 
overconfidence can lead to a reverse pecking order preference. We also find that managerial 
overconfidence significantly weakens pecking order preference especially in firms with high 
earnings volatility and small firms.  
 
Keywords: managerial overconfidence, pecking order preference, optimistic tone.  
JEL classification: G30, G32, G02 
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1. Introduction 
The pecking order theory of capital structure suggests that firms prefer internal to external 
financing and if the internal funds are not sufficient debt is preferred to equity (Donaldson, 
1961; Myers, 1984; Myers and Maljuf, 1984). Empirical evidence on the pecking order 
predictions is mixed. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) propose a test of pecking order theory 
and find it outperforms the static trade-off theory. In contrast, using a larger sample, Frank 
and Goyal (2003) do not find strong evidence for the pecking order theory. They report a 
³SHFNLQJ order puzzle (size anomaly)´ 1 that larger firms, which are relatively less subject to 
the information asymmetry, exhibit more pecking order behaviour. This finding is 
inconsistent with the pecking order model based on information asymmetry. This study 
contributes to the literature on the pecking order puzzle by examining the effect of managerial 
overconfidence on the pecking order preference; it demonstrates empirically that highly 
overconfident managers follow pecking order behaviour less closely than more rational 
managers. Overconfident managers tend to use more equity than debt to finance deficits. 
        To reconcile the pecking order puzzle, it is important to recognize that pecking order 
theory is a conditional theory (Myers, 2001). The most commonly cited condition for pecking 
order is perhaps 0\HUV DQG 0DMOXI¶V  DGYHUVH VHOHFWLRQ2 . However, pecking order 
WKHRU\FDQEHUHJDUGHGDVD³IXQGLQJSUHIHUHQFHWKHRU\´UDWKHUWKDQDSXUHDGYHUVHVHOHFWLRQ
problem (Welch, 2006). The pecking order may arise if issuing more junior securities is 
                                            
1
 De Jong et alUHIHUWR)UDQNDQG*R\DO¶VILQGLQJWKDWILUPVL]HLVSRVLWLYHO\
related to the degree of pecking order as pecking order puzzle or size anomaly. 
2
 The Myers-Majluf (1984) type model shows that the pecking order is conditional on the 
asymmetric information between managers and outside investors. Managers with more inside 
information are reluctant to use external financing, especially the equity, which is 
undervalued by the outsiders. 
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relatively more costly. Thus, the adverse selection costs associated with information sensitive 
securities is only one of the potential drivers of pecking order.3  
        The behavioural finance literature suggests that managerial overconfidence can also 
drive pecking order preference (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Graham and Harvey, 2001; 
Heaton, 2002; Hackbarth, 2008; Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011). Heaton (2002) shows that 
overconfident managers tend to believe they have positive inside information and their firm¶V 
stocks are therefore undervalued by the outsiders. This perceived asymmetric information 
associated with managerial overconfidence leads to a preference for debt over equity. The 
model provides a re-interpretation of the Myers-Maljuf (1984) model from actual information 
asymmetry to perceived information asymmetry being a driver of pecking order (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2005).4 +DFNEDUWK¶V  PRGHO SUHGLFWV DQ HLWKHU VWDQGDUG or reverse pecking 
order for firms subject to two types of managerial overconfidence, namely growth perception 
bias and risk perception bias respectively. 5  The reason why overconfident managers in 
Hackbarth¶V  model may not follow a standard pecking order is that those managers 
especially with risk perception bias (i.e. underestimate the riskiness of earnings) believe that 
                                            
3
 6LPLODUO\)DPDDQG)UHQFK¶VVWXG\VXJJHVWVWKDWDV\PPHWULFLQIRUPDWLRQSUREOHPV
are neither the only nor perhaps even an important determinant of capital structure. They 
IXUWKHUDUJXH WKDW³DQ\IRUFHV WKDWFDXVHILUPV WRV\VWHPDWLFDOO\GHYLDWH IURPSHFNLQJRUGHU
financing imply that the pecking order, as the complete model of capital structure proposed by 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984LVGHDG´2WKHUSRWHQWLDOFRQGLWLRQVRISHFNLQJ
order include agency costs (Leary and Roberts, 2010), corporate taxes (Stiglitz, 1973; 
Hennessy and Whited, 2005) and transaction costs (Welch, 2006). 
4
 Similarly, Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) develop a model of capital structure with 
RYHUFRQILGHQWPDQDJHUVZKRRYHUHVWLPDWHILUPV¶PHDQIXWXUHFDVKIORZDQGWKHUHIRUHEHOLHYH
that their firms are undervalued by the market. Their model also predicts a pecking order 
preference arised from managerial overconfidence, conditional on raising risky external 
capital. 
5
 The standard pecking order preference refers to a preference for debt over equity financing, 
In contrast, the reverse pecking order preference refers to a preference for equity over debt 
financing. Empirically, we expect that at least more than half of the financing deficit is 
financed by equity if a firm follows a reverse pecking order preference. 
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the equity (debt) is overvalued (undervalued). Thus, whether managerial overconfidence 
enhances or weakens pecking order preference is an empirical question.6  
        We use modified Shyam-Sunder and Myers (SSM) (1999) regression to test the impact 
of managerial overconfidence on the pecking order preference. Specifically, our modified 
model is asymmetric so that we can empirically differentiate the impacts of managerial 
overconfidence on issuance and repurchase decisions, although our main focus is on the 
issuance decisions. Our three types of overconfidence measures are constructed based on 
FRPSXWDWLRQDO OLQJXLVWLF DQDO\VLV RI 8. &KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQW QDPHO\ RSWLPLVWLF WRQH7, 
industry-adjusted investment rate, and how executives (e.g. CEO and CFO) trade their own 
ILUPV¶VKDUHV, respectively.  
        We find both optimistic tone and industry-adjusted investment have significant and 
negative impacts on the pecking order coefficient in the SSM (1999) regression framework, 
especially when there is financing deficit. These findings suggest that overconfident managers 
prefer equity to debt to meet external financing needs, meaning that managerial 
overconfidence leads to a reverse pecking order preference. Our evidence supports 
+DFNEDUWK¶VSURSRVLWLRQWKDWRYHUFRQILGHQWPDQDJHUs, who underestimate the riskiness 
of earnings ³ULVNSHUFHSWLRQELDV´, tend to prefer equity to debt financing. We also find that 
the relation between managerial overconfidence and reverse pecking order preference is more 
pronounced for firms with higher earnings volatility, suggesting WKDW³ULVNSHUFHSWLRQELDV´LV
the underlying channel through which overconfidence leads to a reverse pecking order 
preference.  
                                            
6  Importantly, Hackbarth (2008) argues that the ambiguous effects of managerial 
overconfidence on the pecking order may shed light on the inconclusive cross-sectional 
findings on the standard pecking order prediction.  
7
 There is an emerging literature that attempts to capture managerial overconfidence based on 
computational linguistic analysis of corporate disclosures (Ataullah et al., 2017; Hilary et al., 
2016).  
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        Furthermore, we find the effect of overconfidence on the reverse pecking order 
preference is especially strong for small firms. Overconfident managers in small firms are 
reluctant to follow standard pecking order, in which case managerial overconfidence 
contributes to the pecking order puzzle (size anomaly) that small firms with higher 
information asymmetry surprisingly exhibit weaker pecking order preference relative to large 
firms. In addition, the effects of insider trading-based measures of managerial overconfidence 
are, however, relatively weak and less consistent, which is probably because insider 
(especially CEO) trading can be driven by information asymmetry and thus is not a perfect 
proxy for managerial overconfidence. Overall, this study supports the proposition that 
managerial overconfidence is an underlying driver of the reverse pecking order preference, 
which may explain the pecking order puzzle. 
        We proceed as follows. Section 2 first describes pecking order tests and provides a 
review of tests of various pecking order conditions using modified SSM (1999) regression, 
and then develops the hypotheses. Section 4 presents methodology and data. Section 5 
discusses the empirical findings and section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
2.1. Prior literature on the test of the pecking order theory 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (SSM) (1999) propose an empirical model to test the pecking order 
theory. Specifically, they examine to what extent the net debt issues are driven by firm 
financing deficit (DEF). The static pecking order theory suggests that firms with external 
financing need use only debt to fund the deficit. The SSM regression can be written as: οܦ௜௧ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ௉ைܦܧܨ௜௧ ൅ ݁௜௧, where, οܦ௜௧ is the amount of debt issued or retired, ܾ௉ை  is the 
pecking order coefficient, ܦܧܨ௜௧ is the financing deficit. ܾ௉ை is expected to be one under the 
strict pecking order theory. A positive DEF suggests that there is a need for external financing, 
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while a negative DEF means that internal funds are sufficient. It should be noted that the 
model is estimated over both positive and negative financing deficits, assuming a 
homogeneous and symmetric pecking order coefficient. Put differently, the simple pecking 
order suggests that the firm only issues or repurchases equity as a last resort. For firms with 
negative ܦܧܨ௜௧ , it is also expected that ܽ ൌ Ͳ and ܾ௉ை ൌ ͳ. However, the validity of the 
assumption of a homogeneous and symmetric pecking order coefficient in the SSM empirical 
model is questionable, which will be further discussed in section 3.1.  
        However, Shyam-Sunder and Myers¶V (1999) empirical findings are not supported by a 
subsequent study by Frank and Goyal (2003) based on a much larger sample. Frank and 
Goyal (2003) report a puzzling result that large firms are more likely to follow pecking order 
behaviour. This result is inconsistent with the standard pecking order theory based on 
information asymmetry, since firm size is perceived to be negatively related to information 
asymmetry problem.8 This puzzling result is referred to pecking order puzzle or size anomaly 
(De Jong et al., 2010). However, as pointed out by Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011), this 
puzzle may be explained by managerial overconfidence. Specifically, managers of those large 
firms become overconfident due to good past performance and thus have a more pronounced 
pecking order preference. An alternative explanation might be that overconfident managers in 
small firms have a reverse pecking order preference. One major motivation of this study is to 
see whether managerial overconfidence can help explain the pecking order puzzle.  
        It has been recognized that pecking order theory is a conditional theory.9 Its performance 
thus largely depends on various underlying assumptions. Using modified SSM regressions, 
where the pecking order coefficient is treated as heterogeneous, a growing body of literature 
                                            
8
 The literature (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2003; Low and Chen, 2004; Bharah et al., 2009; Brick 
and Liao, 2017) often considers information aysmmetry as a key condition of the pecking 
order preference. 
9
 $JRRGGHVFULSWLRQRIFRQGLWLRQDOWKHRU\LVDVIROORZV³«WKHWKHRU\ILQGVVXSSRUWZKHQLWV
EDVLFDVVXPSWLRQVKROGLQWKHGDWDDVVKRXOGUHDVRQDEO\EHH[SHFWHGRIDQ\WKHRU\´%KDUDWK
et al., 2009). 
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examines various conditions (e.g. information asymmetry, mispricing and market conditions). 
Bharath et al. (2009) examine the impact of information asymmetry on the pecking order 
preference by looking at the interaction between information asymmetry and the DEF. They 
find that firms with higher information asymmetry are more likely to exhibit pecking order 
behaviour. Elliott et al. (2007) test the impact of equity mispricing on the pecking order 
preference. They interact an equity valuation-based measure of firm mispricing with the DEF. 
They find that equity overvaluation weakens the preference for debt over equity financing. 
Huang and Ritter (2009) investigate the impact of market-level mispricing on the pecking 
order preference by interacting the implied market-level equity risk premium (ERP) with the 
DEF. They find that the ERP is positively associated with the preference for debt over equity 
financing, that is, a positive coefficient on the interaction between the ERP and the DEF. 
Notably, +XDQJ DQG 5LWWHU¶V  HPSLULFDO DQDO\VLV RQO\ IRFXVHV RQ firm-years with 
financing deficits (i.e. positive DEF) but not financing surplus (i.e. negative DEF). Our 
empirical analysis also distinguishes between firm-years with financing deficits and surplus. 
In the subsequent section, we discuss the effects of managerial overconfidence on the pecking 
order preference.  
 
2.2. Hypothesis development 
This section develops two competing hypotheses based on behavioural theories of capital 
structure which suggest that managerial overconfidence can either enhance or weaken pecking 
order preference. It has been recognized that the existing empirical evidence on pecking order 
preference can be almost, at face value, explained by managerial optimism (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2013). However, the theoretical relation between managerial overconfidence and 
pecking order behaviour is sensitive to the modelling framework. +HDWRQ¶V  PRGHO
shows that optimistic managers prefer debt to equity since the latter is perceived to be 
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XQGHUYDOXHG0DOPHQGLHUDQG7DWH DUJXH WKDW+HDWRQ¶V PRGHOSURYLGHs a re-
interpretation of the information asymmetry-based pecking order model by Myers-Maljuf 
(1984). The idea is that managerial optimism is associated with perceived positive 
information. In a similar vein, Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) develop a model 10  of 
overconfidence and financing decisions. Their model predicts that overconfident managers 
only use external finance if overestimated returns to investment are greater than the perceived 
costs of external financing. However, when they do use external financing, overconfident 
managers, who believe that debt is less subject to mispricing relative to equity, tend to use 
more debt than their rational counterparts. In brief, their main prediction regarding the 
pecking order behaviour is also consistent with Heaton (2002) and can be stated as follows.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Managerial overconfidence can enhance the preference for debt over 
equity financing.  
 
        In contrast to the predictions of Heaton (2002) and Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011), 
+DFNEDUWK¶V (2008) model shows that managerial overconfidence may lead to a reverse 
pecking order preference. This proposition is inconsistHQWZLWK+HDWRQ¶VPRGHO which 
can be attributed to the different modelling approaches of managerial overconfidence. In 
pDUWLFXODU LQ+DFNEDUWK¶V PRGHORYHUFRQILGHQFH LVPRGHOOHGDV ULVNSHUFHSWLRQELDV
(i.e. underestimation of the riskiness of earnings) which makes overconfident managers 
believe that debt is undervalued by the market because their perceived default risk is lower. In 
                                            
10
 Their model allows for two frictions including tax benefit of debt and financial distress 
FRVW 2YHUFRQILGHQFH LV GHILQHG DV ³WKH RYHUHVWLPDWLRQ RI PHDQ UHWXUQV WR LQYHVWPHQW´ 
Managerial overconfidence can lead to either overinvestment or underinvestment, depending 
on the availability of internal funds or riskless debt financing. In particular, overconfident 
managers with sufficient internal or riskless financing are prone to overinvest. Another 
implication of overconfidence is that overconfident manager may have a biased perception of 
the cost of external financing. For this reason, if there is financing deficit, overconfident 
managers may underinvest. 
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contrast, overconfident managers who underestimate the riskiness of earnings believe that 
WKHLU ILUPV¶ HTXLW\ LV RYHUYDOXHGEHFDXVHRI WKH convexity of equity. Put differently, equity 
can be viewed as a call option11 RQ ILUP¶V DVVHWV DQG WKH YDOXH RI WKLV FDOO RSWLRQ LV SDUWO\
GHWHUPLQHG E\ WKH ULVNV RI ILUP¶V SURMHFW Given that the value of call option is positively 
related to project risk12, overconfident managers who underestimate the project risk believe 
that equity is overvalued. +DFNEDUWK¶V  PRGHO therefore suggests that overconfident 
managers with risk perception bias believe that debt is undervalued but equity is overvalued 
and hence have a reverse pecking order preference. The reversal of the pecking order is in the 
sense that overconfident managers rely more on equity than debt to finance deficits. Based on 
Hackbarth (2008), we propose the following hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: Managerial overconfidence can weaken the preference for debt over 
equity financing.  
 
 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1. The empirical model  
To test the effect of managerial overconfidence on the pecking order preference for debt over 
equity financing, we adopt the modified Shyam-Sunder and Myers (SSM) (1999) regression 
framework where the pecking order coefficient (i.e. the coefficient on the financing deficit 
(DEF)) is heterogeneous and asymmetric. This section briefly describes these two important 
                                            
11 Shareholders have a call option on the firm with an exercise price of X. In a call-option 
graph where the horizontal axis is cash flow to firm and vertical axis is cash flow to 
VKDUHKROGHUVLIILUP¶VFDVKIORZLVEH\RQGX, shareholders will exercise the option by buying 
the firm from the debt holders for the price X ,I ILUP¶VFDVK IORZLVEHORZX, shareholders 
will not exHUFLVHWKHFDOORSWLRQDQGGHEWKROGHUVUHFHLYHHQWLUHILUP¶VFDVKIORZ 
12
 As shown in Black-Scholes model, the value of call option is positively related to the 
variance of the continuous stock returns.  
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dimensions of our empirical model, namely heterogeneity and asymmetry of the pecking 
order coefficient.  
        The original SSM (1999) test assumes that the pecking order coefficient is homogeneous. 
However, there might be cross-sectional differences in terms of the degree of the pecking 
order preference. As discussed earlier, the empirical performance of the pecking order theory 
depends on its underlying conditions (e.g., information asymmetry, managerial 
overconfidence). It is thus more appropriate to assume that the pecking order coefficient is 
heterogeneous. Empirically, one may interact the financing deficit (DEF) with potential 
conditions of the pecking order preference. For example, Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) 
adds an interaction term between managerial overconfidence and the DEF to the SSM (1999) 
regression to examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on the pecking order 
preference. However, their empirical model does not distinguish between firms with financing 
deficit and surplus, which is based on the questionable assumption that the pecking order 
coefficient is symmetric. In what follows, we discuss why it is more plausible to assume the 
pecking order coefficient in the SSM (1999) regression is asymmetric.  
        The original SSM (1999) test and many subsequent studies (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2003; 
Sánchez-Vidal and Martín-Ugedo, 2005; Bharath et al., 2009) do not distinguish between 
negative and positive financing deficit (DEF). According to SSM (1999), pecking order 
EHKDYLRXULVDVVXPHGWREHV\PPHWULFPHDQLQJWKDW³WKHVLPSOHSHFNLQJRUGHU¶VSUHGLFWLRQV
GR QRW GHSHQG RQ WKH VLJQ RI '()´ Put differently WKH\ EHOLHYH WKDW ³WKH 0\HUV-Majluf 
reasoning works in reverse when the company has a surplus and wants to return cash to 
LQYHVWRUV´+RZHYHUKayhan and Titman (2007) point out that SSM¶VDSSURDFKIDLOV
to account for asymmetry between positive and negative DEF. They argue that this 
asymmetry exists because equity issuance and repurchase are associated with different 
information issues. To empirically capture this asymmetric effect, Kayhan and Titman (2007) 
11 
 
interact the DEF with a dummy variable indicating the sign of the DEF (e.g. the dummy 
variable equals one if the DEF is positive and zero otherwise). De Jong et al. (2010) 
empirically examine the asymmetry between the effects of financing deficits and surpluses. 
They also suggest that a correct pecking order specification should differentiate between 
financing deficits (i.e. positive DEF) and financing surpluses (i.e. negative DEF).13 
 
3.2. Measurement of financing deficit (DEF) 
Financing deficit (DEF) can be defined using either balance sheet data (e.g., Fama and French, 
2005; Chang and Dasgupta; 2009) or cash flow data (e.g., Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; 
Frank and Goyal, 2003). This study uses both balance sheet and cash flow data to construct 
the DEF. Specifically, following the balance sheet approach adopted by Chang and Dasgupta 
(2009) and Huang and Ritter (2009), net debt issues is calculated as the difference between 
the change in total assets and the change in book equity; net equity issues is calculated as the 
difference between the change in book equity and the change in retained earnings. The DEF is 
defined as the sum of net equity issues and net debt issues, which is therefore equivalent to 
the change in total assets minus the change in retained earnings. Alternatively, Frank and 
Goyal (2003) use detailed positions of cash flow items to construct the DEF and recode 
missing values to be zero. In particular, they construct the DEF as the sum of dividend 
payments, capital expenditure, net increases in working capital and the current proportion of 
long-term debt at start of period minus operating cash flows after interest and taxes. To avoid 
recoding, similar to Bessler, Drobetz and Grüninger (2011), we use aggregated cash flow 
items. Specifically, net debt issues is measured as long term borrowings minus reduction in 
                                            
13
 They propose the following model to capture the asymmetric pecking order behaviour: οܦ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ݀௜௧ ൅ ߚ௣௢ܦܧܨ௜௧ ൅ ߚ௦௨௥݀௜௧ כ ܦܧܨ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ , where, ݀௜௧  is a dummy variable that 
equals one if ܦܧܨ௜௧ ൏ Ͳ, and zero otherwise. The pecking order coefficient is ߚ௣௢ and (ߚ௣௢ ൅ߚ௦௨௥) respectively for the firms with financing deficits and financing surpluses. They find that 
the estimated pecking order coefficient is 0.90, 0.74 and 0.09 respectively for financing 
surpluses, normal deficits and large deficits. 
12 
 
long term debt. Net equity issues is measured as net proceeds from sale/issue of common and 
preferred stock 14  minus common/preferred redeemed, retired and converted. The above 
variables are scaled by net assets (i.e. total assets minus current liabilities).15 
 
3.3. Measurement of managerial overconfidence  
We use one words-based measure and two action-based measures of managerial 
overconfidence. Words-based overconfidence measure is based on tone analysis of 
&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW7ZRDFWLRQ-based measures are overconfidence beliefs revealed from 
ILUP¶V LQYHVtment activity and insider trading behaviour respectively. In addition, an R&D-
based measure of overconfidence is used as a robustness test. Different from the static 
measures of overconfidence commonly employed in the literature, our overconfidence 
measures, especially the words-based measures, are time-varying16.  
 
3.3.1. Words-based measure of overconfidence: optimistic tone  
We construct two composite tone indices. One is based on the raw tone measures. The other is 
orthogonalized so that each component is not correlated with certain firm characteristics 
(especially standard capital structure determinants). Our first measure of managerial 
overconfidence is based on tone analysis17 RI&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW:HFRQVWUXFWRSWLPLVWLF
tone measures by counting both optimism-increasing and optimism-decreasing words. We use 
                                            
14
 This can also be calculated as the sum of proceeds from stock options and other proceeds 
from sale/issue of common/preferred stock.  
15
 See Appendix A in Bessler et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion on the calculation of the 
DEF. Bessler et al. (2011) also use Worldscope data for their international study.  
16
 Existing behavioural finance studies (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier, Tate 
and Yan, 2011) tend to model managerial overconfidence as a habitual behaviour which is 
static. This static approach can be problematic because other behavioural biases, especially 
self-attribution bias, may affect the confidence level.  
17
 Tone analysis (and more generally textual analysis) is becoming increasingly popular in 
recent accounting and finance studies. For example, Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman (2011) 
examine the relation between disclosure tone and shareholder litigation. For a review on 
13 
 
six individual wordlists. Our first three wordlists are the same as those in Rogers, Buskirk and 
Zechman (2011) and Davis, Ge, Matsumoto and Zhang (2015), namely OPTIMISM, TONE_H 
and TONE_LM. OPTIMISM is a measure of net optimism18 counted using a dictionary in 
Diction 6. 19 TONE_H and TONE_LM are two wordlists developed by Henry (2008) and 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) respectively to measure positive and negative words 
especially in a financial context. TONE_H and TONE_LM are calculated as the ratio of the 
difference between positive and negative words to the sum of positive and negative words.20 
Besides, we also use another three tone measures, all of which are positively related to 
optimism, including CERTAIN1, CERTAIN2 and EMOTION. CERTAIN1 and EMOTION21 
are measured using dictionaries in Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 2007. 
CERTAIN2 is another measure of certainty22 based on a dictionary in Diction 6. Similarly, Li 
ELQFOXGHV³XQFHUWDLQWRQH´ZKLFKLVKLJKO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKnegative tone, in his tone 
measure.  
        Next, we form a composite tone index using principal component analysis (PCA). In 
particular, we define ܱܶܰܧ௜௧ as the first principal components of the correlation matrix of six 
raw tone measures. The first component, with an eigenvalue of 2.609, 23 explains 43.5 percent 
of our sample variance.  
                                            
18
 In Diction, optimism is defined as ³ODQJXDJH HQGRUVLQJ VRPH SHUVRQ JURXS FRQFHSW RU
HYHQWRUKLJKOLJKWLQJWKHLUSRVLWLYHHQWDLOPHQWV´ 
19
 As a unique feature of Diction software, there is standardization procedure when 
calculating a particular item. In particular, we compare our collected &KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWV
to three alternative norms in Diction including (1) all cases, (2) corporate financial reports and 
(3) corporate public relations. Our empirical results are qualitatively similar using alternative 
norms.  
20
 7KH WHUPV³SRVLWLYHQHJDWLYH´DQG³RSWLPLVWLFSHVVLPLVWLF´DUHRIWHQXVHG LQWHUFKDQJHDEO\
in the literature (e.g., Davis, Piger and Sedor, 2012). Li (2010b) standardize the terms to 
³SRVLWLYHQHJDWLYH´LQVWHDGRI³RSWLPLVWLFSHVVLPLVWLF´ 
21
 An earlier veUVLRQRI/,:&KDVDFDWHJRU\QDPHG³RSWLPLVP´KRZHYHULQWKHYHUVLRQ
ZRUGVDUHFODVVLILHGPRUHEURDGO\LQWR³SRVLWLYHHPRWLRQ´DQG³QHJDWLYHHPRWLRQ´ 
22
 ,Q 'LFWLRQ FHUWDLQW\ LV GHILQHG DV ³ODQJXDJH LQGLFDWLQJ UHVROXWHQHVV LQIOH[LELOLW\ DQG
FRPSOHWHQHVVDQGDWHQGHQF\WRVSHDNH[FDWKHGUD´ 
23
 The eigenvalue of second component is close to one (i.e. 1.135).  
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 ܱܶܰܧ௜௧ ൌ෍ ܮ݋ܽ݀݅݊݃௜௝ כ ܶ݋̴݊݁ܺ௜௝௧଺௝ୀଵൌ ͲǤͶͻ͸ܧ݉݋ݐ݅݋݊௜௧ ൅ ͲǤͳͻʹܥ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ͳ௜௧ ൅ ͲǤͶͶ͸ܱ݌ݐ݅݉݅ݏ݉௜௧൅ ͲǤͲʹ͹ܥ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ʹ௜௧ ൅ ͲǤͶͺͲܶ݋̴݊݁ܪ௜௧ ൅ ͲǤͷ͵͸ܶ݋̴݊݁ܮܯ௜௧ (1) 
 
where, ܶ݋̴݊݁ܺ௜௝௧ represent individual tone measure j of firm i in fiscal year t. ܮ݋ܽ݀݅݊݃௜௝ is 
the loading for individual tone measure j of firm i. The loading for Certain1 and Certain2 is 
much lower compared with other tone measures. However, our empirical results are 
qualitatively similar when we exclude those two measures of certainty tone.  
        To address the concern that the raw tone might be contaminated by firm-specific 
variables24, a composite index of the orthogonalized tone measures is constructed as follows. 
First, we regress each individual tone measure on standard determinants of capital structure as 
follows: 
 ܶ݋̴݊݁ܺ௜௝௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܯܤ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܵ݅ݖ݁௜௧ ൅ ߚସܾ݈ܶܽ݊݃݅݅݅ݐݕ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧ (2) 
 
where, ܶ݋̴݊݁ܺ௜௝௧  represents six individual tone measures. ߝ௜௝௧  is the corresponding 
orthogonalized individual tone measures. Next, an orthogonalized composite index 
(ܱܶܰܧ̴ܴܧ ௜ܵ௧ ) is formed based on the first principal component of six residuals (i.e. 
                                            
24
 In terms of the determinants of tone (e.g., current performance, growth opportunities, 
operating risks and complexity), Huang, Teoh and Zhang (2013) find that tone, as measured 
using Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlist, is positively related to market-to-book and 
volatility of stock returns and negatively related to firm size, age and number of business 
segments. Our orthogonalized tone measure (TONE_RES) controls for four standard 
determinants of capital structure (i.e. market-to-book, size, tangibility and profitability). The 
results are similar when we further control for stock price performance and firm age in 
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ܶ݋̴݊݁ܺ௜௝௧ୄ ൌ ߝ௜௝௧) from the above regressions. The first component explains 41.8 percent of 
the sample variance25.  
 ܱܶܰܧ̴ܴܧ ௜ܵ௧ ൌ෍ ܮ݋ܽ݀݅݊݃௜௝ כ ܶ݋݊݁௑௜௝௧ୄ଺௝ୀଵ ൌ෍ ܮ݋ܽ݀݅݊݃௜௝ כ ߝ௜௝௧଺௝ୀଵൌ ͲǤͶͻͷܧ݉݋ݐ݅݋݊௜௧ୄ ൅ ͲǤͳͷͶܥ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ͳ௜௧ୄ ൅ ͲǤͶͶͲܱ݌ݐ݅݉݅ݏ݉௜௧ୄ൅ ͲǤͲ͵͸ܥ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ʹ௜௧ୄ ൅ ͲǤͶͻͲܶ݋̴݊݁ܪ௜௧ୄ ൅ ͲǤͷͶͷܶ݋̴݊݁ܮܯ௜௧ୄ (3) 
 
        :HXVH&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWLQWKH8.DQQXDOUHSRUWDVWKHVRXUFHRIQDUUDWLYHIRUWRQH
DQDO\VLV IRU VHYHUDO UHDVRQV )LUVW &KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQW LV ZLGHO\ UHDG E\ LQYHVWRUV and 
analysts (Bartlett and Chandler, 1997), and is ³WKHORQJHVWHVWDEOLVKHG´ (Clatworthy and Jones, 
2003). 26 6HFRQG&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW LV ODUJHO\ XQDXGLWHG DQGQRWKHDYLO\ UHJXODWHG7KH
ODQJXDJHXVHGLQ&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWLVPXFKOHVVVWDQGDUGWKDQ'LUHFWRUV¶5HSRUWZKLFKLV
subject to regulatory requirements. Third, disclosure-related litigation is rare in the UK 
UHODWLYHWR WKH867KHUHIRUH WKH8.DFFRXQWLQJQDUUDWLYHV HJ&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWDUH
relatively less constrained compared with the MD&A in the US 10-K report. Finally, while 
&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWLVVLJQHGE\chairman, who is often a non-executive director in the UK, 
existing literature27 VHHPVWRDJUHHWKDW&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWLVDQorganizational rather than 
                                            
25
 The eigenvalues of first and second components are 2.509 and 1.139 respectively.  
26
 0DQ\ SUHYLRXV VWXGLHV RQ8. DFFRXQWLQJQDUUDWLYHV IRFXVRQ&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW VHH
e.g., Smith and Taffler, 2000, Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Clatworthy and Jones, 2006). 
6PLWK DQG 7DIIOHU  XVH &KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQW WR SUHGLFW ILUP EDQNUXSWF\ 6FKOHLFKHU
and Walker (2010) conduct manual content analysis of the tone of forward-looking statements 
(i.e. outlook sections) in the UK annual report (most of which are located at the end of 
&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW 
27
 For example, Clatworthy and Jones (2003) argue that accounting narratives such as UK 
&KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQW DOORZ ³PDQDJHPHQW´ WR GHVFUibe corporate financial performance. In 
addition, Schleicher and Walker (2010) attribute the bias in the tone of outlook statements to 
³PDQDJHUV´ ,Q SDUWLFXODU WKH\ DUJXH WKDW ³PDQDJHUV ZLWK D ZLOOLQJQHVV WR HQJDJH LQ
impression management are likely to target forward-ORRNLQJVWDWHPHQWV´ZKLOHSHUFHQW
of the forward-ORRNLQJ QDUUDWLYHV DUH ORFDWHG LQ &KDLUPDQ¶V 6WDWHPHQW 6FKOHLFKHU DQG
Walker, 2010). 
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individual communication. 7KLVPHDQV WKDW ILUP¶VNH\ ILQDQFLDOGHFLVLRQ PDNHUV HJ&(O 
and CFO) also have some LQIOXHQFHVRQWKHFKRLFHRIODQJXDJHLQWKH&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQW 
 
3.3.2. Action-based measure of overconfidence: overinvestment 
Our first action-based measure of overconfidence is industry-adjusted investment rate (IAIR). 
The idea is that overconfidence managers tend to overestimate the present value of future 
investment, which in turn leads to overinvestment. Therefore, higher IAIR may indicate that 
the manager of a particular firm is overconfident. Similarly, Campbell et al. (2011) and 
Huang-Meier et al. (2016) also use an investment-based measure of managerial 
overconfidence. More specifically, we construct the IAIR as WKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQDILUP¶V
investment rate and the median investment rate of the firms in the same 'DWDVWUHDP¶V/HYHO
(INDM4) industry as follows: ܫܣܫܴ௜௧ ൌ ܫܴ௜௧ െ ܫܴ௦ǡప௧തതതതതതത, where, ܫܴ௜௧  is the investment rate of 
firm ݅. ܫܴ௦ǡప௧തതതതതതത is the average investment rate of industry ݏ. The investment rate is defined as the 
ratio of capital expenditures to beginning of year property, plant and equipment. Campbell, et 
al. (2011) classify CEOs as overconfident if their firm is in the top quintile of firms based on 
industry-adjusted investment rates for two consecutive years. However, we believe that 
managerial overconfidence is time-varying and therefore we create a dummy variable 
(IAIR_D) that takes the value of one if the IAIR is in the top quintile in a particular fiscal year 
and zero otherwise. 
 
3.3.3. Action-based measure of overconfidence: net purchase ratio  
:H DOVR JDXJH RYHUFRQILGHQFH EDVHG RQ KRZ PDQDJHUV WUDGH WKHLU RZQ ILUPV¶ VKDUHV The 
insider trading patterns of the managers may UHIOHFW WKHLU SHUFHSWLRQV RI ILUPV¶ SURVSHFWV
(Jenter, 2005). Overconfident managers tend to overestimate the future firm stock 
performance and underestimate risk, and hence are more willing to purchase their own stocks. 
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In the spirit of Jenter (2005) and Jin and Kothari (2008), we use insider trading-based measure 
of managerial overconfidence. We construct the valued-based net purchase ratio (NPR) using 
the value of open market purchases and sales respectively as follows: ܴܰܲ௜௧ ൌ ஻௨௬೔೟ିௌ௘௟௟೔೟஻௨௬೔೟ାௌ௘௟௟೔೟, 
where, ܴܰܲ௜௧ is the NPRs of CEO or CFO of firm ݅ in fiscal year ݐ. ܤݑݕ௜௧ is the aggregate 
value of insider purchases and ݈݈ܵ݁௜௧ is the aggregate value of insider sales. The NPR ranges 
from -1 to 1 and higher NPR indicates higher managerial overconfidence.  
 
3.4. The sample 
The data is from the following sources. 7KH 8. ILUPV¶ ILQDQFLDO GDWD LV REWDLQHG IURP
Thomson Worldscope. Insider trading data is from Hemmington Scott&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWs 
are manually collected from the company annual reports which are downloaded either through 
Northcote website or directly from company websites. Our sample of unbalanced panel data is 
constructed as follows. The selection of sample period is guided by data availability. All 
financial and utility firms are excluded. Firm observations with missing financial data are 
excluded. Observations with the length of fiscal period less than 11 months or over 13 months 
are excluded. To conduct tone analysis, we need the digital version of the UK company 
annual reports, so that the Chairman Statement can be readable by the content analysis 
software (i.e. LIWC 2007 and Diction 6)28. In addition, to construct the insider trading-based 
measure of overconfidence, only those firms with insider transactions in any year during our 
sample period are selected. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to 
                                            
28
 ,QWHUPVRIWKHSURFHGXUHRIFRQWHQWDQDO\VLVZHILUVWH[WUDFW&KDLUPDQ¶V6WDWHPHQWVIURP
annual report. Next, we detect transformation errors in the combined text file using the 
Spelling & Grammar function in Microsoft Word 2010. Finally, various types of errors are 
manually corrected before the texts are inputted in the content analysis software.  
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eliminate the effect of outliers. The final sample comprises 459 firms and 2283 observations 
during the period 1994-201129.  
 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Panel A in Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of main variables. The mean of DEF_CF is 
0.080, which is the sum of οܦ̴ܥܨ (0.020) and οܧ̴ܥܨ (0.060). The mean of DEF_BS is 0.190, 
and the means of οܦ̴ܤܵ and οܧ̴ܤܵ are 0.120 and 0.070 respectively. Importantly, we find 
that the percentage of firm-years with negative DEF should not be neglected. Using aggregate 
cash flow data, the percentage of observations with negative DEF is 37.330, while 8.9 and 53.8 
percent of the observations have zero and positive DEF respectively. Similarly, using balance 
sheet data, around 39 percent of the observations have negative DEF. The large amount of 
observations with financing surplus makes it important to empirically investigate whether the 
magnitude of the pecking order coefficient in SSM framework will depend on the sign of 
DEF. The mean of firm size is 12.320 with a standard deviation of 2.240. The majority of our 
sample firms seem not to have extremely high leverage (the maximum book and market 
leverages are 0.610 and 0.520 respectively), and thus their financing decisions are more likely 
to be motivated by pecking order preference31. Panel B in Table 1 shows the pairwise Pearson 
correlation matrix. The industry-adjusted investment rate dummy (IAIR_D) is positively 
correlated with both tone-based overconfidence measures (except TONE_D) and insider 
trading-based overconfidence measures. In unreported results, we compare balance sheet 
approach and cash flow approach by looking at the correlations between net debt issues, net 
                                            
29
 Most of the observations are after 2000 because machine readable annual reports are almost 
not available in the 1990s.  
30
 This is consistent with 36.2 percent in Lin et al¶V7DLZDQILUPVDPSOH 
31
 Take debt capacity into consideration, the financinJ GHFLVLRQV RI ILUPV ZLWK ³ORZ WR
PRGHUDWH´OHYHUDJHDUHPRUHOLNHO\WRIROORZSHFNLQJRUGHUEHKDYLRXUZKLOHG\QDPLFWUDGH-
RIIWKHRU\EHFRPHVWKHSULPDU\H[SODQDWLRQIRUWKHILQDQFLQJEHKDYLRXURIILUPVZLWK³KLJK´
leverage (and consequently high financial distress costs) (Lemmon and Zender, 2010).  
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equity issues and financing deficit (i.e. the sum of net debt and equity issues). The correlation 
between οD_BS/NA (ο E_BS/NA) and οD_CF/NA (ο E_CF/NA) is 0.605 (0.773). The 
correlation between DEF_BS/NA and DEF_CF/NA is 0.746.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4. Results and discussion 
To examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on the pecking order preference, we use 
a modified Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) financing deficit regression framework as 
follows:  
 οܦ௜௧ ൌ ܽ ൅ ߚଵܦܧܨ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܯ ௜ܱ௧ ൅ ߚଷܯ ௜ܱ௧ כ ܦܧܨ௜௧ ൅ ܤସοࢄ௜௧ ൅ ݒ௜ ൅ ݁௜௧ (4) 
 
where, οܦ௜௧  is net debt issues as a percentage of beginning-of-year net assets. ܦܧܨ௜௧  is a 
measure of financing deficit scaled by net assets. ܯܱ௜௧ is managerial overconfidence. We use 
both words-based (i.e. optimistic tone) and action-based (i.e. firm investment and insider 
trading) measures of managerial overconfidence. ݁௜௧ is the error term. οࢄ௜௧ is a vector of firm-
level controls including changes in market-to-book ratio, firm size, tangibility and 
profitability (see Frank and Goyal, 2003). Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 
firm level. ݒ௜ is time-invariant firm-specific effects. ݁௜௧ is the error term.32 
        In equation 4, a key parameter of interest is ߚଷ . If ߚଷ  is positive, this indicates an 
increase in pecking order coefficient and an enhanced pecking order preference. If ߚଷ  is 
negative, it indicates a decrease in pecking order coefficient and a weakened pecking order 
preference. More specifically, ߚଷ measures the fraction by which an overconfident manager 
                                            
32
 Another way to test the impact of managerial overconfidence on the preference for debt 
over equity financing is logistic analysis which examines the probability of debt issues 
relative to equity issues. However, this approach fails to control for firm fixed effects.  
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uses more (or less) debt financing to cover deficits. For instance, if ߚଷ  is -0.1, an 
overconfident manager uses 10 percentage points less debt to cover deficits. The other 
important area of interest is that the sum of the ߚଵ and ߚଷ gives us the overall proportion of 
debt used by overconfident managers to cover deficits. If the sum of ߚଵ and ߚଷ is less than 0.5 
then it can be inferred that there is a reverse pecking order preference in the sense that less 
debt (below 50%) than equity is being used to cover the deficit. 
 
4.1. Optimistic tone and pecking order preference 
Table 2 reports the effects of optimistic tone on pecking order coefficient (i.e. the coefficient 
on DEF) in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) financing deficit regression. TONE_D and 
TONE_RES_D are binary variables that take the value of 1 if TONE and TONE_RES are 
above their sample median and 0 otherwise. In Table 2 Panel A, we calculate financing deficit 
and net debt issues using balance sheet data. We find that both TONE_D and TONE_RES_D 
have negative and statistically significant effects on the pecking order coefficient in models 1-
4. The negative effect of these two tone dummies is economically and statistically stronger in 
models 3-4 which are based on the subsample of firms with financing deficit (i.e. DEF>0). 
The negative coefficients on TONE_D*DEF and TONE_RES_D*DEF suggest that 
managerial overconfidence, as measured by optimistic tone, leads to a significantly weakened 
pecking order preference. In contrast, in models 5-6 which are based on the subsample of 
firms with financing surplus (i.e. DEF<0), the tone dummies have positive and statistically 
insignificant impacts on the pecking order coefficient.  
        In Table 2 Panel B, we also examine the effects of tone on pecking order preference. As 
a robustness check, we calculate financing deficit and net debt issues using cash flow data. 
Consistent with the results in Panel A, we find that optimistic tone significantly weakens or 
reverses the pecking order preference especially for a subsample of firms with financing 
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deficit. The above results suggest that tone leads to a significantly weakened or reverse 
pecking order preference. One major concern related to this words-based managerial 
overconfidence measure is that tone might be contaminated by information asymmetry, in 
which case rational managers use optimistic tone intentionally to reduce information 
asymmetry. However, if this is the case, tone that is contaminated by information asymmetry 
will enhance pecking order preference, which is not consistent with our empirical findings. 
Therefore, it seems unlikely that the negative relation between tone and pecking order 
coefficient is driven by information asymmetry.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4.2. Industry-adjusted investment rate and pecking order preference 
Table 3 reports the effects of an action-based managerial overconfidence measure, namely 
industry-adjusted investment rate dummy (IAIR_D), on pecking order preference. We find 
that IAIR_D has a negative and statistically significant effect on the pecking order coefficient 
in model 1 and 3 of both Panel A and B in Table 3. This finding suggests that managerial 
overconfidence, as measured by ILUPV¶ RYHULQYHVWPHQW OHDGV WR a reverse pecking order 
preference especially for firms with financing deficit (i.e. DEF>0). In addition, we construct 
an orthogonalized investment-based measure of overconfidence, namely IAIR_RES_D, 
defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the orthogonalized industry-
adjusted investment rate (IAIR) is in the top quintile in a particular fiscal year and zero 
otherwise. This variable is orthogonal to a wide range of firm characteristics and proxies for 
investment opportunities including firm size, MB, profitability, tangibility, firm age, R&D, 
dividend dummy, leverage, cash ratio, and price performance.33 Our empirical results are 
robust to this orthogonalized investment-based measure. In particular, we find that the 
                                            
33
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting we use this orthogonalized investment-
based measure of overconfidence. 
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coefficients on the interaction between IAIR_RES_D and DEF are negative and statistically 
significant in model 4 of Panel A and model 2 and 4 of Panel B in Table 3. 
        These results based on an action-based overconfidence measure further confirm our 
findings that optimistic tone is related to a significantly weakened or reverse preference for 
debt over equity financing. To sum up, we find that both managerial words-based measures 
(i.e. optimistic tone) and action-based measures (i.e. industry-adjusted investment rate) of 
managerial overconfidence leads to a significantly weakened or reverse preference for debt 
over equity especially when there is financing deficit. These findings are consistent with 
hypothesis 1b.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.3. Alternative specification: leverage regression 
Previous studies on the pecking order preference (Frank and Goyal, 2003; Bharath et al., 2009) 
emphasize the importance of employing alternative empirical strategies rather than relying on 
the SSM test. This is because the use of SSM framework to test pecking order theory is 
subject to criticism (Chirinko and Singha, 2000). To address this concern, we use an 
alternative specification, a standard leverage regression, where the dependent variable in the 
SSM regression is replaced with leverage as follows: 
 ܮܧ ௜ܸ௧ ൌ ܽ ൅ ߚଵܦܧܨ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܯ ௜ܱ௧ ൅ ߚଷܯ ௜ܱ௧ כ ܦܧܨ௜௧ ൅ ܤସοࢄ௜௧ ൅ ݒ௜ ൅ ݁௜௧ (5) 
 
where, ܮܧ ௜ܸ௧ is book leverage. Other variables are the same as those in equation 4.  
        Table 4 examines the effects of optimistic tone dummies (i.e. TONE_D and 
TONE_RES_D) and industry-adjusted investment rate dummies (i.e. IAIR_D and 
IAIR_RES_D) on the relationship between financing deficit (DEF) and leverage. Hypothesis 
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1b predicts that managerial overconfidence weakens the positive relationship between the 
DEF and leverage. Consistent with this prediction, the coefficients on the interaction between 
TONE_D and DEF are negative and statistically significant in model 1 and 3 in Panel A. In 
addition, the coefficients on the interaction between both tone dummies, TONE_D and 
TONE_RES_D, and DEF are negative and statistically significant in model 1-4 in Panel B. In 
Panel C and D, we find further supporting evidence based on the action-based managerial 
overconfidence measures, IAIR_D and IAIR_RES_D. In brief, the above evidence is 
consistent with hypothesis 1b, and suggests that managerial overconfidence is associated with 
a preference for equity over debt financing.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.4. Further analysis 
4.4.1. What is the underlying channel through which managerial overconfidence leads to a 
reverse pecking order preference?  
Recall hypothesis 1b that overconfident managers with risk perception bias who 
underestimate the riskiness of firm earnings have a reverse pecking order preference. If risk 
perception bias is the channel through which managerial overconfidence weakens pecking 
order preference, we expect the overconfidence-induced reverse pecking order preference is 
more pronounced especially for firms with higher earnings volatility. Consistent with this 
conjecture, we find that, for firms with relatively higher earnings volatility, both optimistic 
tone and industry-adjusted investment rate have negative and significant impacts on the 
pecking order preference (see model 3 in Panel A and models 1, 3, and 4 in Panel B of Table 
5). In contrast, for firms with low earnings volatility, the impacts of tone and industry-
adjusted investment rate on the pecking order preference are of weak magnitude and 
statistically insignificant.  
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        We may therefore conclude that managerial overconfidence has negative and statistically 
significant impacts on the pecking order preference only for those firms with relatively higher 
earnings volatility. This is consistent with overconfident managers in those highly volatile (in 
terms of the earnings) firms having a biased perception of the riskiness of earnings. This 
biased perception of earnings volatility in turn leads to a much weaker pecking order 
preference as we described in hypothesis 1b. In brief, the above subsample analysis based on 
firm earnings volatility further confirms hypothesis 1b by suggesting that the overconfidence-
induced weakening of pecking order preference is clearly connected to the underestimation of 
earnings volatility.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
4.4.2. Can managerial overconfidence explain the pecking order puzzle (size anomaly)? 
Next, we examine whether the effects of managerial overconfidence on pecking order 
preference are different for small and large firms. This analysis is motivated by the pecking 
order puzzle documented by Frank and Goyal (2003) that firm size is positively associated 
with the degree of pecking order preference, which contradicts the standard pecking order 
theory. A potential explanation for this puzzle is that overconfident managers in smaller firms 
are reluctant to follow standard pecking order although smaller firms are subject to higher 
information costs. To test this conjecture, we split the whole sample into two subsamples 
based on firm size: models 1-4 in Panel A and B of Table 6 includes firm-year observations 
with firm size below median, while models 5-8 in Panel A and B of Table 6 includes firm-
year observations with firm size above median.  
        Table 6 compares the effects of our overconfidence measures, optimistic tone (see Panel 
A) and industry-adjusted investment rate (see Panel B) respectively, on pecking order 
preference for small and large firms. &RQVLVWHQWZLWK)UDQNDQG*R\DO¶V REVHUYDWLRQ
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that small firms exhibit weaker pecking order preference, we also find that the pecking order 
coefficient (i.e. the coefficient on DEF) is smaller for small firms. More importantly, we find 
that both optimistic tone (see models 1, 3 and 5 in Panel A of Table 6) and industry-adjusted 
investment rate (see models 3-4 in Panel B of Table 6) have negative and statistically 
significant impacts on the pecking order coefficient especially for small firms. This finding 
sheds important light on the pecking order puzzle. In particular, our results suggest that 
managerial overconfidence in small firms makes those small firms less willing to follow 
standard pecking order and therefore contribute to the pecking order puzzle (or size anomaly).  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4.4.3. Do net purchases (as a proxy for overconfidence) of CEO and CFO have the same 
impact on pecking order preference?  
Table 7 presents the effects of overconfidence of both CEO and CFO, as measured by their 
net purchase ratio (NPR), on the pecking order preference. CEO_NPRD and CFO_NPRD are 
binary variables that take the value of 1 if the NPR of CEO and CFO respectively take the 
value of one and 0 otherwise. In Panel A, financing deficits and net debt issues are calculated 
using balance sheet data. We find that the coefficients on CFO_NPRD*DEF are negative and 
statistically significant (see models 2 and 4 in Panel A of Table 8). This finding suggests that 
the CFO net purchase leads to weakened pecking order preference. The results related to the 
CFO net purchase is consistent with our findings based on alternative overconfidence 
measures (i.e. optimistic tone and industry-adjusted investment rate) that managerial 
overconfidence weakens the pecking order preference. In contrast, the coefficients on 
CEO_NPRD*DEF are positive but statistically insignificant (see models 1 and 3 in Panel A of 
Table 7). The opposite effect of CEO net purchase could potentially be attributed to the fact 
WKDW&(2KDVPRUHSULYDWHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXW WKHILUPUHODWLYHWR&)2DQGWKHUHIRUH&(2¶V
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trading is more likely to be driven by information asymmetry rather than CEO overconfidence. 
In other words, CEO insider trading more reflects private information rather than 
overconfidence. Therefore, we find that CEO net purchase, which is likely to be contaminated 
by information asymmetry, is associated with an enhanced pecking order preference.  
        In Panel B, we calculate financing deficit and net debt issues using cash flow data. The 
results in models 1-4 of Panel B are generally consistent with those in Panel A in terms of the 
signs of the coefficients on CEO_NPRD*DEF and CFO_NPRD*DEF but statistically 
insignificant. Overall, the evidence based on the insider trading-based measures of CEO and 
CFO overconfidence are relatively mixed and statistically weaker, which may be due to the 
fact that insider trading is likely to be driven by information asymmetry. However, the finding 
that &)2RYHUFRQILGHQFHDVPHDVXUHGE\WKHLUQHWSXUFKDVHRIWKHLURZQILUPV¶VKDUHOHDGVWR
a weakened pecking order preference is consistent with our main findings based on our main 
measures of managerial overconfidence (i.e. optimistic tone and industry-adjusted investment 
rate).  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
4.5. Alternative overconfidence measures and pecking order preference  
As a robustness check, we employ an alternative, albeit imperfect, investment-based measure 
of managerial overconfidence based on the R&D intensity. Shefrin (2007, p. 4-6) provides a 
case study illustrating the link between managerial overconfidence and R&D investment. Sun 
Microsystems increased R&D investment in 2000, which in turn significantly decreased firm 
market value. This value-destroying R&D investment is attributed to the overconfidence bias 
RI6XQ¶V&(26FRWW0F1HDO\ZKRLVRIWHQGHVFULEHGE\WKHPHGLDDV³RSWLPLVWLF´DQGKROGV
firm stock options too long. In addition, previous studies (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011; 
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Hirshleifer et al., 2012) provide strong evidence that highly intensive firm innovation 
activities can be significantly driven by managerial overconfidence.  
        We thus construct an R&D-based managerial overconfidence measure, namely R&D_D, 
defined as a dummy variable that equals one if the R&D-to-sales ratio of a firm is in the top 
quintile in a particular fiscal year and zero otherwise. In addition, we construct an 
orthogonalized R&D-based overconfidence measure, namely R&D_RES_D, defined as a 
dummy variable that equals one if the orthogonalized R&D-to-sales ratio is in the top quintile 
in a particular fiscal year and zero otherwise. This variable is orthogonal to firm size, MB, 
profitability, tangibility, firm age, dividend dummy, leverage, cash ratio, and price 
performance.  
        Table 8 shows that the coefficients on the interactions between the R&D-based 
managerial overconfidence measures, R&D_D and R&D_RES_D, and the DEF are negative 
and statistically significant in models 1-3 in Panel A and models 1-4 in Panel B. This 
additional evidence confirms our previous findings in Table 2 and 3, suggesting that our main 
findings are robust to alternative managerial overconfidence measures. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
4.6. Further robustness tests 
Our main findings are robust to three alternative model specifications. First, as an alternative 
way to test and compare the effects of managerial overconfidence on the pecking order 
coefficient of firms with positive and negative DEF, we use the following modified Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) regression:  
 οܦ௜௧ ൌ ܽ ൅ ߚଵܲܦܧܨ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܰܦܧܨ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܯܱ௜௧ ൅ ߚସܯܱ௜௧ כ ܲܦܧܨ௜௧ ൅ ߚହܯܱ௜௧כ ܰܦܧܨ௜௧ ൅ ܤ଺οܺ௜௧ ൅ ݒ௜ ൅ ݁௜௧ (6) 
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where, οܦ௜௧ is net debt issues as a percentage of beginning-of-year net assets. ܲܦܧܨ௜௧ equals ܦܧܨ௜௧  if ܦܧܨ௜௧ ൐ Ͳ  and zero otherwise; ܰܦܧܨ௜௧  equals ܦܧܨ௜௧  if ܦܧܨ௜௧ ൏ Ͳ  and zero 
otherwise. ܯܱ௜௧  is managerial overconfidence. The definitions of other variables in this 
equation are the same as in equation 4. In this alternative specification, the pecking order 
coefficients are also heterogeneous and asymmetric. In untabulated results, we find that both 
tone dummies and IAIR_D have negative and significant effects on the coefficient of PDEF, 
which confirms our earlier finding that tone has negative and significant impacts on the 
coefficient of DEF especially in the subsample with positive DEF. In brief, two alternative 
specifications (i.e. equation 4 and 6) provide largely consistent results.  
        Second, we check whether our main findings are sensitive to scaling of the DEF. 
Although not required by the pecking order theory, the purpose of scaling is to control for the 
differences in firm size. Frank and Goyal (2003) point out that the coefficient estimates can be 
highly sensitive to scaling if the denominator is correlated with some variables in the 
regression. We therefore normalize the DEF by two alternative denominators, namely total 
assets and sales. The results are not sensitive to scaling. Third, as a robustness check, we 
exclude from our analysis those firm-years with zero leverage34. The reason is that standard 
capital structure theories (e.g. trade-off theory, pecking order theory and market timing theory) 
are almost silent on the zero-leverage puzzle that some firms do not use any debt financing. 
Given that the main purpose of this study is to test pecking order preference, we exclude zero-
leverage observations from our tests and the empirical results are qualitatively similar.  
        Finally, our managerial overconfidence measures may be driven by investor sentiment. 
Specifically, managers may be more confident, especially when sentiment is high and ILUP¶V
stocks are overvalued by the irrational investors. If this is the case, the relationship between 
                                            
34
 Over 14 percent of the observations (i.e. 326 out of 2283 observations) have zero leverage 
in our sample.  
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our overconfidence measures and the reverse pecking order behaviour may be partly 
attributed to investor sentiment, because the market timing theory of capital structure (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002) suggests that managers tend to use more equity financing if they believe 
WKDWWKHLUILUPV¶VWRFNVDUHRYHUYDOXHG in hot markets (Maung, 2014). To address this concern, 
in untabulated analysis we control for the UK Consumer Confidence Index35, as a proxy for 
investor sentiment. We construct several new orthogonalized overconfidence measures that 
are not correlated with investor sentiment, by controlling for investor sentiment in equation 2; 
however, we still find that the effects of these alternative overconfidence measures on the 
pecking order behaviour are consistent with our baseline results, ruling out the market timing 
explanation.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper is motivated by contrasting theoretical predictions made by Heaton (2002) and 
Hackbarth (2008) that managerial overconfidence can be either positively or negatively 
related to the degree of pecking order preference. A related study by Malmendier, Tate and 
Yan (2011) provides empirical evidence that CEO overconfidence leads to an enhanced 
pecking order preference. Our empirical strategies are different from Malmendier, Tate and 
Yan (2011) in two important aspects. First, we use modified Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
regression that distinguishes between firms with financing deficits and surpluses. Second, we 
extend prior work by developing and using time-varying measures of managerial 
overconfidence. Our empirical findings are in contrast to Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) 
but support +DFNEDUWK¶V  SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW PDQDJHULDO RYHUFRQILGHQFH FDQ lead to a 
reverse pecking order preference. We find consistent evidence that managerial overconfidence 
                                            
35
 The consumer confidence data can be downloaded from the European Commission website 
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/indicators-statistics/economic-databases), 
and has been used in previous studies (e.g., Schmeling, 2009) to measure investor sentiment.  
30 
 
weakens the preference for debt over equity financing by a statistically significant and 
economically substantial amount. In many cases there is a reversal of pecking order 
preference in the sense that less debt than equity is used to finance deficits. This new evidence 
LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK +DFNEDUWK¶V  PRGHO SUHGLFWLRQ WKDW RYHUFRQILGHQW PDQDJHUV ZLWK
³ULVN SHUFHSWLRQ ELDV´ LH XQGHUHVWLPDWLRQ RI Whe riskiness of earnings) prefer equity over 
debt financing because of the convexity of equity.  
        Further support for this proposition is provided by showing that the overconfidence-
induced reverse pecking order preference is more pronounced for firms with high earnings 
YRODWLOLW\7KLVILQGLQJVXJJHVWVWKDW³ULVNSHUFHSWLRQELDV´LVWKHXQGHUO\LQJFKDQQHOWKURXJK
which overconfidence weakens the pecking order preference. Interestingly, we further 
document that managerial overconfidence is more strongly associated with a reverse pecking 
order preference especially for small firms. This finding sheds important light on the pecking 
order puzzle (or size anomaly): small firms surprisingly exhibit substantially weaker pecking 
order preference when their managers are overconfident.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the main dependent and independent variables. Panel B shows 
Pearson correlation coefficients between all pairs of our main variables. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Median Max. 
DEF_BS/NA 2283 0.190 0.560 -1.110 0.060 3.040 ο D_BS/NA 2283 0.120 0.370 -0.630 0.040 2.030 ο E_BS/NA 2283 0.070 0.310 -0.790 0.010 1.950 
DEF_CF/NA 2283 0.080 0.330 -0.430 0.000 2.030 ο D_CF/NA 2283 0.020 0.140 -0.310 0.000 0.790 ο E_CF/NA 2283 0.060 0.260 -0.310 0.000 1.800 
MB 2283 1.760 1.260 0.560 1.400 8.790 
Firm size 2283 12.320 2.240 6.140 12.510 16.870 
Tangibility 2283 0.260 0.230 0.000 0.200 0.890 
Profitability 2283 0.090 0.180 -0.880 0.120 0.390 
TONE 2283 -0.000 1.615 -5.693 0.150 3.676 
TONE_D 2283 0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CEO_NPR 1327 0.330 0.890 -1.000 1.000 1.000 
CEO_NPRD 1327 0.610 0.490 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CFO_NPR 1071 0.460 0.830 -1.000 1.000 1.000 
CFO_NPRD 1071 0.680 0.470 0.000 1.000 1.000 
IAIR_D 2283 0.100 0.300 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel B. Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. TONE 1       
2. TONE_D 0.796 1      
3. CEO_NPR -0.156 -0.050 1     
4. CEO_NPRD -0.147 -0.053 0.936 1    
5. CFO_NPR -0.141 -0.054 0.670 0.617 1   
6. CFO_NPRD -0.116 -0.031 0.609 0.595 0.933 1  
7. IAIR_D 0.004 0.020 0.036 0.055 0.050 0.059 1 
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Table 2 Optimistic tone and pecking order preference 
This table examines the effect of optimistic tone dummies (i.e. TONE_D and TONE_RES_D that are one if tone 
index and orthogonalized tone index are above their median respectively and zero otherwise) on the pecking 
order preference by looking at the interaction between tone dummies and financing deficit (DEF) in the Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) financing deficit regression framework. The dependent variable is net debt issues 
scaled by net assets. Financing deficit and net debt issues are calculated using balance sheet and cash flow data 
in Panel A and B respectively. Models 1-2 are based on the full sample, while models 3-4 and models 5-6 focus 
on firm-years observations with financing deficit (i.e. DEF_BS>0 or DEF_CF>0) and financing surplus (i.e. 
DEF_BS<0 or DEF_CF<0) respectively. Constants are included but not reported. All models are estimated using 
fixed effects within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. The interaction between tone and DEF_BS 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Full sample(models 1-2) DEF_BS>0 (models 3-4) DEF_BS<0 (models 5-6) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.603*** 0.591*** 0.643*** 0.612*** 0.240*** 0.228*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
TONE_D 0.012  0.018  0.014  
 (0.307)  (0.247)  (0.354)  
TONE_D*DEF -0.085**  -0.122***  0.000  
 (0.024)  (0.006)  (0.999)  
TONE_RES_D  0.022*  0.028  0.022 
  (0.062)  (0.126)  (0.115) 
TONE_RES_D*DEF  -0.070*  -0.087*  0.025 
  (0.099)  (0.098)  (0.782) ο MB -0.006 -0.006 0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.555) (0.542) (0.821) (0.899) (0.866) (0.846) ο Firm size 0.140*** 0.143*** 0.116** 0.120** 0.161*** 0.163*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.018) (0.004) (0.003) ο Tangibility -0.026 -0.010 0.271 0.277* -0.195 -0.189 
 (0.826) (0.930) (0.103) (0.099) (0.243) (0.254) ο Profitability -0.259*** -0.262*** -0.318*** -0.326*** -0.204*** -0.205*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Within R2 0.687 0.686 0.664 0.659 0.206 0.208 
Obs. 2283 2283 1451 1451 832 832 
Panel B. The interaction between tone and DEF_CF 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
 Full sample (models 1-2) DEF_CF>0 (models 3-4) DEF_CF<0 (models 5-6) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.813*** 0.748*** 0.812*** 0.709*** 0.487** 0.296 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.318) 
TONE_D 0.043***  0.075***  0.021  
 (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.334)  
TONE_D*DEF -0.234***  -0.329***  -0.267  
 (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.332)  
TONE_RES_D  0.042***  0.068**  0.044 
  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.103) 
TONE_RES_D*DEF  -0.145*  -0.191*  0.088 
  (0.087)  (0.072)  (0.770) ο MB -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.032** -0.030* -0.029 -0.024 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.047) (0.063) (0.101) (0.161) ο Firm size 0.301*** 0.311*** 0.313*** 0.331*** 0.450*** 0.457*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) ο Tangibility -0.185 -0.182 -0.222 -0.209 0.049 0.049 
 (0.322) (0.334) (0.386) (0.427) (0.880) (0.880) ο Profitability -0.389*** -0.398*** -0.529*** -0.571*** -0.349*** -0.346*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) 
Within R2 0.384 0.379 0.370 0.356 0.160 0.157 
Obs. 2283 2283 1124 1124 1067 1067 
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Table 3 Industry-adjusted investment rate and pecking order preference 
This table examines the effect of industry-adjusted investment rate dummies (i.e. IAIR_D and IAIR_RES_D) on 
the pecking order preference by looking at the interaction between these dummies and financing deficit (DEF) in 
the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) financing deficit regression framework. The dependent variable is net debt 
issues scaled by net assets. Financing deficit and net debt issues are calculated using balance sheet and cash flow 
data in Panel A and B respectively. Models 1-2 are based on the full sample, while models 3-4 and models 5-6 
focus on firm-years observations with financing deficit (i.e. DEF_BS>0 or DEF_CF>0) and financing surplus 
(i.e. DEF_BS<0 or DEF_CF<0) respectively. Constants are included but not reported. All models are estimated 
using fixed effects within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are 
given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. The interaction between IAIR and DEF_BS 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Full sample (models 1-2) DEF_BS>0 (models 3-4) DEF_BS<0 (models 5-6) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.587*** 0.564*** 0.620*** 0.594*** 0.255*** 0.260*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IAIR_D 0.075***  0.134***  -0.127**  
 (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.029)  
IAIR_D*DEF -0.152**  -0.219***  -0.242  
 (0.020)  (0.005)  (0.210)  
IAIR_RES_D  0.027  0.060**  -0.079** 
  (0.149)  (0.038)  (0.022) 
IAIR_RES_D*DEF  -0.065  -0.124*  -0.148 
  (0.277)  (0.088)  (0.323) ο MB -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.621) (0.580) (0.989) (0.997) (0.813) (0.883) ο Firm size 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.131** 0.131** 0.166*** 0.171*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) ο Tangibility 0.028 0.002 0.393* 0.392** -0.203 -0.233 
 (0.828) (0.987) (0.056) (0.034) (0.226) (0.178) ο Profitability -0.241*** -0.258*** -0.295** -0.318*** -0.188*** -0.193*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
Within R2 0.692 0.681 0.678 0.657 0.218 0.220 
Obs. 2283 2246 1451 1434 832 812 
Panel B. The interaction between IAIR and DEF_CF 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
 Full sample (models 1-2) DEF_CF>0 (models 3-4) DEF_CF<0 (models 5-6) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.393*** 0.380*** 0.280*** 0.269*** 0.558*** 0.557*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IAIR_D 0.048***  0.062***  0.016  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.163)  
IAIR_D*DEF -0.175***  -0.126***  0.016  
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.927)  
IAIR_RES_D  0.024**  0.033**  0.009 
  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.434) 
IAIR_RES_D*DEF  -0.129***  -0.097***  0.014 
  (0.001)  (0.008)  (0.923) ο MB -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.838) (0.753) (0.605) (0.707) (0.336) (0.301) ο Firm size 0.026** 0.028** 0.038** 0.040** -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.032) (0.024) (0.291) (0.303) ο Tangibility 0.077 0.065 0.020 0.032 0.063 0.059 
 (0.306) (0.369) (0.853) (0.763) (0.280) (0.298) ο Profitability -0.144*** -0.151*** -0.138*** -0.140*** -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.670) (0.646) 
Within R2 0.466 0.444 0.328 0.306 0.330 0.329 
Obs. 2283 2246 1124 1113 1067 1042 
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Table 4 Alternative specifications: leverage regression 
This table examines the effects of both optimistic tone dummies (i.e. TONE_D and TONE_RES_D that are one if 
tone index and orthogonalized tone index are above their median respectively and zero otherwise) and industry-
adjusted investment rate dummies (i.e. IAIR_D and IAIR_RES_D) on the pecking order preference using an 
alternative specification. Specifically, the dependent variable in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) regression 
is replaced with book leverage, defined as total debt scaled by total assets. Financing deficit is calculated using 
balance sheet data in Panel A and C, and using cash flow data in Panel B and D. Panel A and B examine the 
interaction between tone and DEF, while Panel C and D examine the interaction between industry-adjusted 
investment rate (IAIR) and DEF. Models 1-2 are based on the full sample, while models 3-4 and models 5-6 
focus on firm-years observations with financing deficit (i.e. DEF_BS>0 or DEF_CF>0) and financing surplus 
(i.e. DEF_BS<0 or DEF_CF<0) respectively. Constants are included but not reported. All models are estimated 
using fixed effects within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are 
given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. The interaction between tone and DEF_BS 
Dependent variable: total debt/total assets 
  Full sample(models 1-2) DEF_BS>0 (models 3-4) DEF_BS<0 (models 5-6) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.036*** 0.028*** 0.041** 0.055*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.005) 
TONE_D -0.015***  -0.010*  -0.027***  
 (0.000)  (0.053)  (0.002)  
TONE_D*DEF -0.014*  -0.019*  -0.046  
 (0.075)  (0.077)  (0.112)  
TONE_RES_D  -0.014***  -0.009*  -0.036*** 
  (0.000)  (0.050)  (0.000) 
TONE_RES_D*DEF  -0.007  -0.010  -0.081*** 
  (0.240)  (0.149)  (0.006) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.061 0.055 0.059 0.048 0.062 0.079 
Obs. 2283 2283 1451 1451 832 832 
Panel B. The interaction between tone and DEF_CF 
Dependent variable: total debt/total assets 
 Full sample (models 1-2) DEF_CF>0 (models 3-4) DEF_CF<0 (models 5-6) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.078*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.046*** 0.064 0.063 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.339) (0.370) 
TONE_D -0.014***  -0.011**  -0.020**  
 (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.012)  
TONE_D*DEF -0.048***  -0.042**  -0.013  
 (0.006)  (0.021)  (0.865)  
TONE_RES_D  -0.012***  -0.010**  -0.022*** 
  (0.001)  (0.031)  (0.004) 
TONE_RES_D*DEF  -0.032**  -0.025*  -0.003 
  (0.017)  (0.058)  (0.972) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.066 0.056 0.057 0.042 0.062 0.067 
Obs. 2283 2283 1124 1124 1067 1067 
 
(Continuing on the next page) 
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Panel C. The interaction between IAIR and DEF_BS 
Dependent variable: total debt/total assets 
  Full sample(models 1-2) DEF_BS>0 (models 3-4) DEF_BS<0 (models 5-6) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.015 0.016 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.381) (0.349) 
IAIR_D 0.002  0.016*  -0.004  
 (0.739)  (0.067)  (0.839)  
IAIR_D*DEF -0.017***  -0.020***  0.042  
 (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.401)  
IAIR_RES_D  0.007  0.016**  -0.011 
  (0.294)  (0.024)  (0.522) 
IAIR_RES_D*DEF  -0.016**  -0.017**  0.009 
  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.842) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.048 0.046 0.044 0.041 0.041 0.040 
Obs. 2283 2246 1451 1434 832 812 
Panel D. The interaction between IAIR and DEF_CF 
Dependent variable: total debt/total assets 
 Full sample (models 1-2) DEF_CF>0 (models 3-4) DEF_CF<0 (models 5-6) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.126*** 0.143*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
IAIR_D 0.005  0.013  -0.041*  
 (0.485)  (0.145)  (0.067)  
IAIR_D*DEF -0.045***  -0.045***  -0.231  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.250)  
IAIR_RES_D  0.009  0.011  -0.020 
  (0.159)  (0.174)  (0.223) 
IAIR_RES_D*DEF  -0.044***  -0.042***  -0.234* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.068) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.052 0.050 0.051 0.050 0.042 0.041 
Obs. 2283 2246 1124 1113 1067 1042 
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Table 5 The effect of earnings volatility on the relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and pecking order preference 
This table examines whether the effect of managerial overconfidence on the pecking order preference depends 
on earnings volatility. Earnings volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the first difference in EBITD in 
the past five years (at least three years), scaled by the average book value of assets. We therefore compare the 
results from two subsamples divided by earnings volatility. The dependent variable is net debt issues scaled by 
net assets. Panel A compares the effects of tone on the pecking order preference of firms with high and low 
earnings volatility. Models 1-4 in Panel A are based on the subsample including firms with earnings volatility 
above its median and models 5-8 in Panel A are based on the subsample including firms with earnings volatility 
below its median. Panel B compares the effects of industry-adjusted investment rate on the pecking order 
preference of firms with high and low earnings volatility. Models 1-4 in Panel B are based on the subsample 
including firms with earnings volatility above its median and models 5-8 in Panel B are based on the subsample 
including firms with earnings volatility below its median. DEF_BS indicates that financing deficit and net debt 
issues are calculated using balance sheet data. DEF_CF indicates that financing deficit and net debt issues are 
calculated using cash flow data. Constants are included but not reported. All models are estimated using fixed 
effects within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. The interactions between tone and both DEF_BS and DEF_CF 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Firms with high earnings volatility (models 1-4) Firms with low earnings volatility (models 5-8) 
  DEF_BS (models 1-2) DEF_CF (models 3-4) DEF_BS (models 5-6) DEF_CF (models 7-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DEF 0.515*** 0.499*** 0.776*** 0.717*** 0.780*** 0.774*** 0.819*** 0.809*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TONE_D -0.005  0.035  0.024**  0.053**  
 (0.808)  (0.110)  (0.019)  (0.011)  
TONE_D*DEF -0.075  -0.239*  -0.041  0.022  
 (0.239)  (0.096)  (0.348)  (0.882)  
TONE_RES_D  0.006  0.042*  0.026***  0.045** 
  (0.780)  (0.069)  (0.007)  (0.023) 
TONE_RES_D*DEF -0.047  -0.144  -0.037  0.042 
  (0.475)  (0.264)  (0.390)  (0.760) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.576 0.573 0.372 0.365 0.895 0.895 0.516 0.515 
Obs. 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 
Panel B. The interactions between IAIR and both DEF_BS and DEF_CF 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
 Firms with high earnings volatility (models 1-4) Firms with low earnings volatility (models 5-8) 
 DEF_BS (models 1-2) DEF_CF (models 3-4) DEF_BS (models 5-6) DEF_CF (models 7-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DEF 0.512*** 0.479*** 0.317*** 0.305*** 0.750*** 0.745*** 0.676*** 0.662*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IAIR_D 0.028  0.030**  0.050**  0.023*  
 (0.430)  (0.026)  (0.038)  (0.068)  
IAIR_D*DEF -0.185*  -0.134***  0.000  0.001  
 (0.085)  (0.005)  (0.994)  (0.994)  
IAIR_RES_D  -0.013  0.014  0.021  0.009 
  (0.692)  (0.280)  (0.279)  (0.362) 
IAIR_RES_D*DEF  -0.072  -0.101**  0.026  0.075 
  (0.497)  (0.036)  (0.643)  (0.284) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.589 0.565 0.416 0.391 0.895 0.896 0.773 0.772 
Obs. 1095 1082 1095 1082 1095 1071 1095 1071 
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Table 6 The effect of firm size on the relationship between managerial overconfidence 
and pecking order preference 
This table examines whether the effect of managerial overconfidence on the pecking order preference depends 
on firm size. We therefore compare the results from two subsamples divided by firm size. The dependent 
variable is net debt issues scaled by net assets. Panel A compares the effects of tone on the pecking order 
preference of small and large firms. Models 1-4 in Panel A are based on the subsample including small firms 
with firm size below its median and models 5-8 in Panel A are based on the subsample including large firms 
with firm size above its median. Panel B compares the effects of industry-adjusted investment rate on the 
pecking order preference of small and large firms. Models 1-4 in Panel B are based on the subsample including 
small firms with firm size below its median and models 5-8 in Panel B are based on the subsample including 
large firms with firm size above its median. DEF_BS indicates that financing deficit and net debt issues are 
calculated using balance sheet data. DEF_CF indicates that financing deficit and net debt issues are calculated 
using cash flow data. Constants are included but not reported. All models are estimated using fixed effects within 
estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. The interactions between tone and both DEF_BS and DEF_CF 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Small firms (models 1-4) Large firms (models 5-8) 
  DEF_BS (models 1-2) DEF_CF (models 3-4) DEF_BS (models 5-6) DEF_CF (models 7-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DEF 0.501*** 0.451*** 0.661*** 0.539*** 0.769*** 0.760*** 0.911*** 0.927*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TONE_D 0.000   0.050**  0.038***  0.042**  
 (0.991)  (0.044)  (0.000)  (0.042)  
TONE_D*DEF -0.131***  -0.324***  -0.070*  0.063   
 (0.010)  (0.002)  (0.099)  (0.545)  
TONE_RES_D  0.014   0.053**  0.032***  0.024  
  (0.486)  (0.026)  (0.000)  (0.180) 
TONE_RES_D*DEF -0.051  -0.153  -0.063   0.047 
  (0.407)  (0.180)  (0.186)  (0.664) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.529 0.517 0.264 0.244 0.882 0.881 0.562 0.560 
Obs. 1141 1141 1141 1141 1142 1142 1142 1142 
Panel B. The interactions between IAIR and both DEF_BS and DEF_CF 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
 Small firms (models 1-4) Large firms (models 5-6) 
 DEF_BS (models 1-2) DEF_CF (models 3-4) DEF_BS (models 5-6) DEF_CF (models 7-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DEF 0.444*** 0.439*** 0.254*** 0.245*** 0.747*** 0.734*** 0.604*** 0.607*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IAIR_D 0.028  0.028***  0.064  0.020  
 (0.334)  (0.008)  (0.133)  (0.249)  
IAIR_D*DEF -0.073  -0.127***  -0.139  -0.034  
 (0.387)  (0.000)  (0.258)  (0.727)  
IAIR_RES_D  0.038  0.026**  -0.010  -0.000 
  (0.179)  (0.013)  (0.520)  (0.972) 
IAIR_RES_D*DEF  -0.082  -0.116***  -0.015  -0.018 
  (0.354)  (0.000)  (0.686)  (0.836) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.518 0.508 0.310 0.304 0.883 0.904 0.709 0.702 
Obs. 1141 1130 1141 1130 1142 1116 1142 1116 
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Table 7 Net purchase of CEO and CFO and pecking order preference 
This table examines the effect of CEO/CFO net purchase dummies (i.e. CEO_NPRD and CFO_NPRD that are 
one if the net purchase ratio (NPR) of CEO and CFO are 1 and zero otherwise) on the pecking order preference 
by looking at the interaction between CEO/CFO net purchase dummies and financing deficit (DEF) in the 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) financing deficit regression framework. The dependent variable is net debt 
issues scaled by net assets. Financing deficit and net debt issues are calculated using balance sheet data in Panel 
A. Models 1-2 in Panel A are based on the full sample, while models 3-4 and models 5-6 in Panel A focus on 
firm-years observations with financing deficit (i.e. DEF_BS>0) and financing surplus (i.e. DEF_BS<0) 
respectively. Financing deficit and net debt issues are calculated using cash flow data in Panel B. Models 1-2 in 
Panel B are based on the full sample, while models 3-4 and models 5-6 in Panel B focus on firm-years 
observations with financing deficit (i.e. DEF_CF>0) and financing surplus (i.e. DEF_CF<0) respectively. 
Constants are included but not reported. All models are estimated using fixed effects within estimators. Robust 
standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. The interaction between net purchases and DEF_BS 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Full sample (models 1-2) DEF_BS>0 (models 3-4) DEF_BS<0 (models 5-6) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.579*** 0.705*** 0.584*** 0.697*** 0.257** 0.236 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.439) 
CEO_NPRD 0.003  -0.001  -0.005  
 (0.680)  (0.905)  (0.677)  
CEO_NPRD*DEF 0.022  0.076  -0.024  
 (0.691)  (0.131)  (0.863)  
CFO_NPRD  0.003  0.004  -0.001 
  (0.719)  (0.651)  (0.960) 
CFO_NPRD*DEF  -0.091*  -0.098*  0.170 
  (0.064)  (0.083)  (0.579) 
 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.706 0.757 0.740 0.772 0.219 0.505 
Obs. 1327 1071 843 680 484 391 
Panel B. The interaction between net purchases and DEF_CF 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
 Full sample (models 1-2) DEF_CF>0 (models 3-4) DEF_CF<0 (models 5-6) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.404*** 0.503*** 0.249*** 0.425*** 0.697*** 0.655*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO_NPRD -0.004   -0.011   -0.006   
 (0.317)  (0.21)  (0.183)  
CEO_NPRD*DEF 0.045   0.114   -0.049   
 (0.638)  (0.284)  (0.658)  
CFO_NPRD  0.002   -0.002   0.000 
  (0.654)  (0.798)  (0.934) 
CFO_NPRD*DEF  -0.072   -0.123   -0.177  
  (0.380)  (0.228)  (0.529) 
 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.544 0.522 0.446 0.449 0.467 0.244 
Obs. 1327 1071 649 523 623 515 
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Table 8 Alternative overconfidence measures and pecking order preference 
This table examines the effect of R&D dummies (i.e. R&D_D and R&D_RES_D that are one if the R&D-to-sales 
ratio and orthogonalized R&D-to-sales ratio are in the top quintile in a particular fiscal year respectively and 
zero otherwise) on the pecking order preference by looking at the interaction between tone dummies and 
financing deficit (DEF) in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) financing deficit regression framework. The 
dependent variable is net debt issues scaled by net assets. Financing deficit and net debt issues are calculated 
using balance sheet and cash flow data in Panel A and B respectively. Models 1-2 are based on the full sample, 
while models 3-4 and models 5-6 focus on firm-years observations with financing deficit (i.e. DEF_BS>0 or 
DEF_CF>0) and financing surplus (i.e. DEF_BS<0 or DEF_CF<0) respectively. Constants are included but not 
reported. All models are estimated using fixed effects within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for 
firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. The interaction between R&D and DEF_BS 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Full sample (models 1-2) DEF_BS>0 (models 3-4) DEF_BS<0 (models 5-6) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.604*** 0.573*** 0.613*** 0.570*** 0.273*** 0.275*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D_D 0.060**  0.092**  -0.030  
 (0.019)  (0.026)  (0.335)  
R&D_D*DEF -0.216***  -0.210***  -0.145  
 (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.265)  
R&D_RES_D  0.047*  0.042  -0.038 
  (0.075)  (0.275)  (0.116) 
R&D_RES_D*DEF  -0.112**  -0.071  -0.149 
  (0.039)  (0.274)  (0.254) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.697 0.684 0.667 0.651 0.213 0.217 
Obs. 2251 2246 1436 1434 815 812 
Panel B. The interaction between R&D and DEF_CF 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
 Full sample (models 1-2) DEF_CF>0 (models 3-4) DEF_CF<0 (models 5-6) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.441*** 0.399*** 0.328*** 0.288*** 0.591*** 0.588*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D_D 0.031**  0.030  -0.014*  
 (0.013)  (0.175)  (0.097)  
R&D_D*DEF -0.291***  -0.262***  -0.245  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.150)  
R&D_RES_D  0.023*  0.023  -0.011 
  (0.061)  (0.291)  (0.239) 
R&D_RES_D*DEF  -0.211***  -0.195***  -0.213 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.210) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.493 0.460 0.374 0.335 0.335 0.334 
Obs. 2251 2246 1115 1113 1045 1042 
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Appendix 1 Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Measures of managerial overconfidence  
a) Content analysis-based measures (optimistic tone measures) 
Net emotion Positive emotion minus negative emotion including (anxiety, anger and sadness) as 
defined by LIWC 
Certain1 Measure of certainty (e.g. always, never) as one aspect of cognitive processes as defined 
by LIWC 
Optimism [praise+satisfaction+inspiration]-[blame+hardship+denial] as defined by Diction 
Certain2  [tenacity+leveling+collectives+insistence]-[numerical terms+ambivalence+self 
reference+variety] as defined by Diction  
Tone_H (positive-QHJDWLYHSRVLWLYHQHJDWLYHXVLQJ+HQU\¶VZRUGOLVW 
Tone_LM (positive-QHJDWLYHSRVLWLYHQHJDWLYHXVLQJ/RXJKUDQDQG0F'RQDOG¶VZRUGOLVW 
TONE_D A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the composite tone index (see equation 1) 
is above the median and zero otherwise 
TONE_RES_D A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the orthogonalized tone index (see 
equation 3) is above the median and zero otherwise 
b) Investment-based measures 
IAIR_D A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the industry-adjusted investment rate 
(IAIR) is in the top quintile in a particular fiscal year and zero otherwise. Industry-
adjusted investment rate is the ratio of capital expenditure to the beginning of year 
property, plant and equipment 
IAIR_RES_D A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the orthogonalized industry-adjusted 
investment rate (IAIR) is in the top quintile in a particular fiscal year and zero otherwise. 
This variable is orthogonal to firm size, MB, profitability, tangibility, firm age, R&D, 
dividend dummy, leverage, cash ratio, and price performance. 
R&D_D A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the R&D-to-sales ratio is in the top 
quintile in a particular fiscal year and zero otherwise. 
R&D_RES_D A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the orthogonalized R&D-to-sales ratio is 
in the top quintile in a particular fiscal year and zero otherwise. This variable is orthogonal 
to firm size, MB, profitability, tangibility, firm age, dividend dummy, leverage, cash ratio, 
and price performance. 
c) Insider trading-based measures (i.e. net purchase ratio (NPR)=(buy - sell)/(buy + sell)) 
CEO_NPRD 
 
CFO_NPRD 
 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the net purchase ratio of CEO 
(CEO_NPR) is 1 and zero otherwise 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the net purchase ratio of CFO 
(CFO_NPR) is 1 and zero otherwise 
Panel B:Dependent variable and measures of financing deficit (DEF) 
DEF_CF )LQDQFLQJGHILFLWPHDVXUHGXVLQJDJJUHJDWHFDVKIORZGDWDLHǻD+ǻE)  
1HWGHEWLVVXHVǻ'B&) Long term borrowings minus reduction in long term debt  
1HWHTXLW\LVVXHVǻ(B&) Net proceeds from sale/issue of common and preferred stocks minus common/preferred 
redeemed, retired, converted 
DEF_BS )LQDQFLQJGHILFLWPHDVXUHGXVLQJEDODQFHVKHHWGDWDLHǻD+ǻE  ǻA- ǻRE) 
Net debt issues ǻ'B%6 Change in total assets minus change in book equity  
1HWHTXLW\LVVXHVǻ(B%6 Change in book equity minus change in retained earnings  
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets 
Firm size Natural logarithm of sales 
MB The ratio of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of 
equity to book value of total assets  
Profitability Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation divided by total assets 
Tangibility  Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets 
Earnings volatility The standard deviation of the first difference in EBITD in the past five years (at least three 
years), scaled by the average book value of assets 
Firm age The natural logarithm of the number of months since the incorporate date 
R&D Research and development (R&D) expenditures divided by sales (missing R&D values are 
set equal to zero) 
Dividend dummy A dummy variable that takes the value of one if common dividend is positive and zero 
otherwise 
Cash ratio Cash divided by total assets 
Price performance The difference of natural logarithm of fiscal year-end share prices  
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